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Abstract
This paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in
local spending decisions. Previous tests have relied on cross-sectional data while
we make use of a pair of California referenda to estimate a first difference specification. The referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local
educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 percent and 67 to 55 percent, respectively. We find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when
deciding how to vote on voting rules, but the empirical evidence strongly suggests
that an income percentile below the median is decisive for majority voting rules.
This finding is consistent with high income voters with weak demand for public
educational services voting with the poor against increases in public spending on
education.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: H4, H7, I2
Keywords: Median Voter Hypothesis, Voting, Referenda, Education Spending

1.

Introduction
The median voter model has a long theoretical and empirical history within public economics.

Since the pioneering work of Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), which established the conditions under
which the median voter is also the voter with the median income, hundreds of studies have used the
median voter framework to estimate demands for publicly provided goods and services. The enduring
popularity of the median voter model stems both from its simplicity and its analytic tractability. As noted
by Inman (1978), if governments act “as if” to maximize the preferences of the median income voter, the
median voter hypothesis provides “a powerful starting point for predictive and normative analysis of
government behavior.”
Despite the wide spread popularity of the median voter model, the key assumption that the
median voter is also the voter with the median income has been repeatedly challenged. 1 For example,
Epple and Romano (1996a) demonstrate that when there are private alternatives to public services (e.g.
private schools), an equilibrium exists where the median income voter is not pivotal. Instead, the pivotal
voter has an income that lies below the median. They describe this finding as “Ends against the Middle”
where high income voters join the poor to oppose spending on education. Similarly, Fletcher and Kenny
(2008) develop a model in which the elderly, who typically have little demand for local educational
services, vote with the poor in support of lower levels of education spending. They demonstrate that a
larger share of elderly results in a median voter who is further down a community’s income distribution.
In light of these challenges, numerous studies have attempted to test whether the voter with the
median income is empirically relevant for describing local public service provision. Pommerehne and
Frey (1976), Pommerehne (1978), Inman (1978), Deno and Mehay (1987), Turnbull and Djoundourian
(1994) and Turnbull and Mitias (1998) evaluate the performance of the median voter model by examining
whether the use of median income in local public service demand regressions outperforms other
specifications (such as replacing median income with mean income). The results of those studies
generally support the hypothesis that the median income voter is decisive. 2 On the other hand, Aronsson
and Magnus (1996) test the predictive power of a model where the median income voter is assumed to be
decisive against a more general statistical alternative. Their results lead them to reject the hypothesis that
the voter with the median income is decisive. Similarly, based on county-level data from 1990 and 2000,
Fletcher and Kenny find evidence that the median voter is not the voter with the median income. Rather,
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See Holcombe (1989) for a review of the criticisms and concerns surrounding the median voter model, and see
Wildasin (1986) for an extended discussion of the assumptions required for the median voter model to be applied
empirically.
2
Using a revealed preference approach, Turnbull and Chang (1998) also find that local governments act “as if” to
maximize the utility of the median income voter.
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they find that as the share of elderly in a community increases, the voter with the pivotal income is
located farther down the community’s income distribution.
While the empirical studies listed above employ different datasets and different methodologies, a
common feature of nearly all prior studies that test the median voter hypothesis is that they rely on
aggregate cross-sectional data to identify the relationship between public service outcomes and a
community’s median income. These studies are likely biased because communities differ across a variety
of dimensions including unobserved preferences for public services, the cost of providing public services,
etc; and these differences are likely correlated with the distribution of income in each community.
Furthermore, prior studies have typically attempted to test the median voter hypothesis using the same
framework that is used to estimate demands for publicly provided goods; namely, by examining the
relationship between community expenditures and some measure of community income. Consequently,
those studies suffer from the same fundamental problem of measuring actual service demands that
plagues most studies that utilize the median voter model to estimate demands for publicly provided
goods.
In this paper, we propose an entirely new approach for testing the median voter hypothesis. We
examine vote returns from a unique pair of California referenda that proposed changing the rules under
which public spending decisions are determined. Specifically, the first referendum, which failed,
proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50
percent, and the second referendum, which was held only eight months later and passed, proposed
lowering the vote requirement from 67 to 55 percent. Thus, assuming demand is monotonically
increasing in income, the first referenda would have changed the identity of the decisive voter from the
voter in the 33rd percentile of the income distribution to the 50th percentile while the second referenda
would have changed the identity of the decisive voter from the voter in the 33 rd percentile to the voter in
the 45th percentile. Using the results from these two referenda, we test whether people vote “as if” future
spending decisions will be based upon the preferences of the newly proposed decisive voter by examining
whether the change in the fraction of ‘yes’ votes cast in the two elections can be explained by the implied
change in the newly proposed decisive voter’s income, i.e. the difference between the 50th and 45th
percentile income in a jurisdiction. We also test an additional implication of referenda voting models,
namely that the influence of the decisive voter’s preferences on vote outcomes declines with jurisdiction
heterogeneity (Romer, Rosenthal and Munley 1992; Rothstein 1994).
Unlike previous tests of the median voter hypothesis, where public service spending is used to
infer a relationship between the median voter’s preferences and outcomes of the political process, our test
infers that a median voter relationship holds because voters act as if the relationship holds when they cast
their ballots to determine voting rules for choosing the level of public services provided. Consequently,
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our test avoids the fundamental problem of measuring the actual services demanded by voters within a
jurisdiction which may be poorly proxied by the measures used in previous studies, such as expenditures
per capita. Furthermore, by regressing changes in the fraction of ‘yes’ votes between the referendums on
changes in the income associated with the decisive voter in each district, we are able to difference out
school district unobservables that are likely correlated with the distribution of income within a district.
We find a strong relationship between the income distribution of a school district and the change
in the fraction of ‘yes’ votes between the two referenda. This relationship, however, appears to arise from
the influence of the income difference between 40th and 35th percentile on voting rather than the 50 th to
45th percentile. Specifically, while the income difference between the 50th to 45th percentile can explain
changes in voting between the two referenda, when we run a “horse race” between the changes in income
between the 50th to 45th percentile and the 40th and 35th percentile, the difference between lower
percentiles entirely captures the systematic relationship between the income distribution and voting.3
This finding is consistent with earlier work by Epple and Romano (1996a) and Fletcher and Kenny (2008)
which suggests that the income of the decisive voter will be below the median income when high income
voters with low demand for education services vote with the poor in support of low levels of public
services. Furthermore, when we split our sample based on the fraction of individuals in a district that are
high income and yet are expected to have low demand for public education services (e.g. households
without children, households with children in private school, and voters age 55 or older), the evidence
points towards a lower income percentile decisive voter for districts with a greater fraction of high income
households with low demand and a higher income percentile decisive voter for districts with a smaller
fraction of high income households with low demand.
Our findings based on a decisive voter at the 40th percentile of income for a majority voting rule
are very robust. Our estimates imply that the decrease in income between the 40 th and 35th percentile in a
school district led to somewhere between a 2.1 and 3.2 percentage point increase in the percent voting yes
for the school districts in our sample. 4 This compares to an actual increase in the percent voting yes of
4.3 percentage points. These findings persist across a series of specifications controlling for changes in
turnout and political representation between the two referenda, differences between small and large
school districts, demographic differences between school districts, as well as model extensions that allow
demand to depend upon the tax price of educational spending. The estimated relationship also persists for
constant income elasticity models that allow for heterogeneity in the distribution of preferences across
3

Note that the theory of referenda voting on which our empirical model is built holds as long as the decisive voter
can be characterized by an income percentile. This percentile need not be the 50th percentile.
4
If we consider the 40th percentile as being decisive under a majority voting rule, a larger decline between the 40 th
and 35th percentile income implies a larger decline in the increase in education spending that voters can expect from
moving the current vote share of two-thirds to the new requirement of 50 or 55. Consequently, more voters are
willing to support the second referendum because it implies a smaller increase in spending.
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school districts. Furthermore, we find that the relationship between the income of the jurisdiction’s
decisive voter and the likelihood of supporting a referendum does not hold for two counterfactuals
estimated by replacing school districts with alternative definitions of jurisdiction based on census tracts
and state assembly districts.
Finally, we also find evidence that the relationship between the decisive voter’s demand and
support for voting rules is weaker in more heterogeneous districts; evidence that provides empirical
support for the referenda voting models developed by Romer, Rosenthal and Munley (1992) and
Rothstein (1994). Empirical support for referenda models of this type is especially important given that
these models predict less electoral support for spending initiatives in the presence of greater voter
heterogeneity; a prediction that is consistent with empirical findings of Alesina, Baqir and Easterly
(1999).

2.

Review of the Literature on the Median Voter Model
Over the last several decades hundreds of studies have used the median voter model to estimate

demands for publicly provided goods and services. 5 The vast majority of those studies use aggregate
cross sectional data to identify a relationship between public service expenditure levels and a
community’s median income.6 Consequently, these studies either implicitly or explicitly rely on the
results of Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) that show that, “subject to certain strong assumptions, majority
rule implies that one can treat an observation of expenditure levels in a given jurisdiction as a point on the
demand curve of a citizen of that community with median income for the community” (Bergstrom
Rubinfeld and Shapiro, 1982, p. 1184).
Despite (or possibly because of) the wide spread popularity of the median voter model, the
assumptions required for the model to hold have been repeatedly questioned. Preferences may not be
single peaked when voters have preferences over multiple issues (McKelvey 1976) or when private
alternatives exist (Stiglitz 1972; Epple and Romano 1996a). Politicians and bureaucrats may use their
ability to set the political agenda in order to maximize their budget (Niskanen 1975; Romer and Rosenthal
1979a, 1979b, 1982; Romer Rosenthal, and Munley 1992; Balsdon, Brunner, and Ruben 2003), or they
may make decisions based on their party’s or their own personal ideology (Levitt 1996; Gerber and Lewis
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A review of older studies that use the median voter framework to estimate demand can be found in Inman (1979).
A few of the more recent studies include, Rothstein (1992), Silva and Sonstelie (1995), Stevens and Mason (1996),
and de Bartolome (1997) for school spending, Schwab and Zampelli (1987) for police, Duncombe (1991) for fire,
Balsdon, Brunner and Rueben (2003) for local general obligation bond issues, and Husted and Kenny (1997) for
expansion of the voting franchise.
6
A smaller set of studies, including Bergstrom, Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1982), Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982) and
Rubinfeld, Shapiro and Roberts (1987), use individual-level survey data to estimate demand for publicly provided
goods and services. See Rubinfeld (1987) for a review of these types of studies.
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(2004); Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004); Reed 2006; Washington 2008).7 Notably, Gerber and Lewis
(2004) find that this tendancy to follow party ideology is much stronger in heterogeneous jurisdictions.
Similarly, politicians may have an incentive to act strategically (and in ways that deviate from the
preferences of the median voter) because voter turnout may be influenced by differential voter reactions
to their past actions (Hasting, Kain, Staiger, and Weinstein 2007) or by the media (Gentzkow 2006;
DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007). Finally, voting may be driven by the anticipated capitalization of school
quality into housing prices (Nechyba 2000; Brunner and Imazeki 2008; and Cellini, Ferrera and Rothstein
2008).
Furthermore, the standard assumption that the median voter is also the voter with the median
income has been repeatedly questioned. As noted previously, Epple and Romano (1996a, 1996b)
demonstrate that when there exist private alternatives to public goods or when public goods can be
supplemented with private purchases, an equilibrium exists where the pivotal voter has an income that lies
below the median. Similarly, Fletcher and Kenny (2008) demonstrate that when the elderly have low
demands for public services, a coalition of the elderly and the poor leads to a pivotal voter that once again
has an income that lies below the median. Both of these papers describe situations where voters at the
ends of the income distribution combine to oppose the preferences of voters in the middle of the income
distribution. In addition, most of the studies that estimate demand for local public goods have ignored the
issue of Tiebout sorting, in which households choose communities based in part upon their demand for
public services.8 As noted by Ross and Yinger (1999), with Tiebout sorting communities may contain
both higher income households with weak preferences for public services and lower income households
with strong preferences for public services. Consequently, the median preference voter may not be the
voter with the median income.9
Finally, nearly all empirical studies that utilize the median voter framework suffer from the
fundamental problem of measuring the actual services demanded by voters. The vast majority of studies
use community-level expenditures to infer a relationship between the median voter’s preferences for
publicly provided services and outcomes of the political process. However, as noted by Behrman and
Craig (1987), “… people pay taxes based on the city-wide amount of purchased inputs, but base their
demand and voting behavior on the perceived level of neighborhood service output” (Behrman and Craig,
1987, p. 47). To the extent that the services produced differ substantially across jurisdictions given the
same public inputs, public spending will provide a poor proxy for public service provision. Furthermore,
7

See Kalt and Zupan (1984), Goff and Grier (1993), and Bailey and Brady (1998) for earlier studies that document a
link between jurisdiction heterogeneity and legislator’s voting behavior.
8
See Goldstein and Pauly (1981) for a nice discussion of the implications of Tiebout sorting on estimated public
service demand parameters.
9
Epple and Sieg (1999) estimate a structural model that allows for preference heterogeneity and enables them to
estimate income and price elasticities in a model that explicitly identifies the median preference voter.

5

unobserved community characteristics that influence the cost of providing public services are likely to be
correlated with other community characteristics like median income. 10 As a result, studies that fail to
properly control for the costs associated with providing public services are likely to be biased. That fact
is highlighted by Schwab and Zampelli (1987) who find that studies of public service demand that fail to
take into account the impact of community characteristics on the cost of public service provision can yield
very misleading results.

3.

Conceptual Framework
Prior to 2000, local school bond measures in California required a two-thirds supermajority to

pass. If voters approved a bond issue, the bonds were then repaid with local property tax increases that
remained in effect until the bonds were fully repaid. In 2000 Californians voted on two statewide
initiatives designed to ease this supermajority vote requirement. In March of 2000 Californians voted on
Proposition 26, an initiative that would have reduced the vote requirement on school bond measures to a
simple majority. The proposition garnered the support of only 47 percent of voters and thus failed. In
November of 2000 Californians voted on Proposition 39, an initiative that was nearly identical to
Proposition 26 except it called for reducing the vote requirement on local school bond measures to 55%.
This time California voters approved the measure with 53 percent of voters supporting Proposition 39.
To motivate our empirical test of the median voter model, we begin by examining the
implications of the median voter model for the behavior of voters in a referendum on voting rules.
Specifically, we develop a simple voting model based on Romer, Rosenthal and Munley (1992) and
Rothstein (1994) in order to illustrate the relationship between support for a change in required vote share
and the income of the decisive voter. Let S ij* denote the desired level of school spending of individual

i located in school district j . The individual votes in favor of a decrease in the vote share required to
pass spending referenda to P if and only if S P , the spending level under the new vote share, is preferred
to S 0 , the spending level under the current, higher vote share requirement.
Following Rothstein (1994), we parameterize individual preferences for school spending using
the desired spending level S ij* so that an individual’s indirect utility function V ( S j | S ij* ) is maximized
when district spending level S j = S ij* . We allow districts to vary in terms of resident’s preference for
school spending by assuming that the distribution of preferences in district j is distributed around a
district mean preference S *j or
10

See Ross and Yinger (1999) for a survey of studies that document cost heterogeneity across jurisdictions, as well
as recent additional studies by Duncombe and Yinger (2005) and Reschovsky and Imazeki (2003).
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S ij* = S *j + µ ij ,

(1)

where µ ij is a random disturbance. Assuming preferences over public service levels are single peaked, a
unique α Pj exists so that V ( S 0j | a Pj ) = V ( S Pj | α Pj ) where V is a voter’s indirect utility function
conditional on their preferences for the public service. 11 A voter supports the referendum to lower the
vote share requirement (presumably increasing public service levels) if and only if S ij* > α Pj .
The function α Pj only varies across communities based on the values of S 0j and S jp because all
households in the economy are assumed to have common preferences except for the preference shifter S ij* .
Using a linear parameterization, α Pj may be written as

a Pj = α ( S 0j , S Pj ) + ν j = (1 − δ ) S 0j + δS Pj + υ j ,

(2)

where δ is between zero and one. Finally, substituting equations (1) and (2) into the inequality above, we
find that a voter supports the reduction in the vote share requirement if and only if

S

*
j

− [( 1 − δ ) S

0
j

+ δS

P
j

]>υ

j

− µ ij .

(3)

Let pyes j denote the fraction of voters in district j that prefer S P to S 0 . If υ j and µ ij follow
independent type 1 extreme value distributions, then the difference has a logistic distribution with a
cumulative distribution function based on equation (3) of

(

)  ,


 x − S *j − [(1 − δ ) S 0j + δS Pj ]
F ( x) = 1 − exp− exp

β



where the variance of the distribution is





1 2 2
β π and equals the sum of the variances of
3

(4)

υ j and µ ij , σ ν2

and σ µ2 respectively, assuming that the two disturbances are independent (Johnson, Kotz, and
11

Specifically, we assume that indifference curves are convex over public service levels and property tax rates so
that given a well-behaved community budget constraint an individual has a unique preferred level of public service
and utility declines as the public service level is increased above or decreased below that preferred level, see Epple
and Romano (1996a, 1996b) as well as many other earlier papers that impose such assumptions. This implies that

V ( S j | S ij* ) is a concave function of S j see Rothstein (1994) and Balsdon and Brunner (2005).
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β

Balakrishnan, 1995). If we assume that

is constant across communities and without loss of generality

initialized to one, the log-odds ratio can by expressed as:

 pyes j
ln
 1 − pyes
j



 = c 0 + c1 S *j − c 2 S 0j − c 3 S Pj + ε j ,



(5)

where c1, c2, and c3 are all non-negative as found by Rothstein (1994) and ε j represents district specific
factors that influence voting independent of public service demand.12 Equation (5) suggests a simple
differencing estimation strategy. Specifically, if the first initiative imposed a required vote share of 50%
for spending referenda and the second initiative imposed a 55% vote share, the difference in the log-odds
of the fraction of voters that support the two initiatives in district j is:

 pyes 2j
ln
 1 − pyes 2
j


 pyes 1j

 − ln
 1 − pyes 1

j




50
 = −c 3 ( S 55
j − S j ) + (ε j 2 − ε j1 ) ,



(6)

where both the unique district mean preference for public service levels, the default level of public service
provision, and any idiosyncratic, time invariant district attributes that influence voting drop out of the
model.
β

The assumption that

is constant across communities, however, is quite strong given other

assumptions in the model. Specifically, once µ ij is restricted to follow an independent type 1 extreme
value distribution, σ µ2 , the variance of µ ij , must be positively related to the difference between the 50th
and 55th percentile demands since only an increase in the variance can create additional spread at the
β

center of the distribution holding the form of the distribution fixed. Therefore, the assumption that

is

constant requires that σ ν2 falls by the exact same amount as any increase in σ µ2 . Further, there are
reasons to believe that υ j and µ ij are correlated across communities and that σ ν2 might also depend
upon factors that influence the heterogeneity of preferences. The disturbance υ j captures community
specific errors describing the indifference point between the proposed and initial spending levels, S P and

S 0 , which obviously depends on S * . Different values of S P and S 0 fall in different regions of the
12

Equation (5) involves aggregate vote shares. The aggregation from equation (3), which is based on individual
preferences, is accomplished via the assumption of an extreme value distribution for the unobservable associated
with the distribution of individual preferences within a jurisdiction and for the unobservable associated with
parameterizing

α Pj , the preference level in a community that is indifferent between the referendum passing or

failing. This assumption leads to jurisdiction vote shares that depend upon the standard logistic distribution.
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indirect utility function, with different curvature, and so while S 0 will be differenced out of demand
equations and S P will enter directly into our model, they may still influence the distribution of υ j .
Naturally, S P and S 0 depend upon the same unobservables that influence the distribution of µ ij , and
equation (6) is extended to allow for heterogeneity in the distribution of preference across districts:

 pyes 2j
ln
 1 − pyes 2
j


 pyes 1j

 − ln
 1 − pyes 1

j




c ( S 55 − S 50
j )
=− 3 j
+ (ε j 2 − ε j1 ) ,

β
j


(7)

where β j describes the unique standard deviation of the preference distribution for community j.
As equation (7) reveals, preference heterogeneity, as measured by β , scales the influence that the
decisive voter’s demand has on referenda vote outcomes. Specifically, the influence of the decisive
voter’s demand on the determination of voting rules is smaller in more heterogeneous districts (i.e.
districts with a larger β ). This result mirrors the results of Romer, Rosenthal and Munley (1992) and
Rothstein (1994), who demonstrated that, all else equal, greater preference heterogeneity within
jurisdictions results in lower approval margins for local referenda, and is consistent with the empirical
findings of Gerber and Lewis (2004). In the present context, equation (7) suggests that differences in the
desired level of spending of the 50th and 55th percentile voters should have a smaller impact on the change
in the fraction of ‘yes’ votes in districts with significant preference heterogeneity and a greater impact in
districts with relatively little preference heterogeneity.
Further, given that the decisive voter in the second referenda has lower income and lower demand
for public services, the demand term in equation (7) always implies an increase in voting yes between the
first and second referenda, and increases in preference heterogeneity unambiguously reduce the increase
in support for the proposal between the two referenda. This result is consistent with the conclusions of
Romer, Rosenthal and Munley (1992) in their analysis of referenda that directly establish the level of
spending on public goods. Specifically, they conclude that electoral support for spending increases is
reduced in heterogeneous communities. 13 In our model, this result can be observed from equation (4)
where the impact of support for a proposed level of public services S P on the likelihood of voting yes is
scaled down by preference heterogeneity as captured by β .

13

See Proposition 2 in Romer, Rosenthal and Munley (1992).
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4.

Empirical Methodology
In order to operationalize equation (6), initially maintaining the assumption that

β

is constant

across communities, we assume that for referendum k the implied future level of public service is a
function of the income percentile associated with the vote share required under the referendum. For a 50
percent vote share and assuming demand is monotonically increasing with income, the standard median
voter assumption applies where the future level of public service is a function of the median income in the
school district. For a 55 percent vote share, which is the share associated with the second referendum,
the future level of public service is a function of the district’s 45 th percentile income. Specifically, a
higher vote share for passage decreases the level of public service that will be supported by voters and
thus shifts the decisive income further down the distribution. Assuming a linear form for public service
demand yields
− Pk
− Pk
S Pjk = S ( y 100
) = b1 + b y y 100
,
j
j

(8)
100 − Pk

where Pk is the required vote share for referendum k , y j

or y jk for short is the income at the

decisive percentile, and b y is the parameter describing the responsiveness of demand to income.
Substituting equation (8) into equation (6) for the two referenda and rearranging yields

 pyes 1j
 pyes 2j 
 − ln
ln
 1 − pyes 1
 1 − pyes 2 
j 
j




 = (d1 − d 2 ) + d y ( y j1 − y j 2 ) + (ε j1 − ε j 2 ) ,



(9)

where the d y parameter is just the b y parameter from equation (8) multiplied by the negative term − c3
and the difference between d 2 and d 1 allows the mean of the district unobservable, ε jk , to vary across
referenda k. The median or decisive voter model predicts that d y should be positive since public service
demand increases with income. Specifically, each referendum is assumed to be supported by all voters
who prefer the new higher level of spending to current spending based on the two-thirds vote
requirement. A larger income difference between the 50 th and 55th percentile voter (i.e. the 50th and 45th
percentile income), implies a larger reduction in new education spending or a smaller increase in spending
over current levels, which is then supported by more voters .
The first difference specifications utilized in equations (9) eliminates unobserved differences
across districts in the average preference for public services, political leaning, time invariant differences
in turnout rates, as well as a host of other idiosyncratic differences that affect voting and additively enter
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the estimation equation. Consequently, the first difference specification eliminates time invariant factors
that influence voting patterns and might be correlated with the income distribution and thus bias a crosssectional aggregate test of the median or decisive voter model. Nevertheless, our first difference
specification does not address the concern that changes in the decisive voter’s income between referenda
may be correlated with unobservables that affect the change in vote share between referenda. In order to
control for such factors, additional models of change in vote share are estimated including linear controls
for voter turnout and other attributes intended to capture changes in the composition of voters between the
two referenda, such as district size and fraction residents that are college educated.
As discussed earlier, the median income may not be decisive under a majority rule, and
accordingly we consider the income difference between other income percentiles. Specifically, we run
regressions that include the income difference between the 50 th and 45th percentiles along with an
additional income difference, such as the difference between the 45th and 40th or the 60th and 55th
percentiles. The winner of these so called “Horse Races” provides evidence concerning the income of the
decisive voter under majority voting. 14

Heterogeneous Preference Distributions with Constant Elasticity Demand
By specifying public service demand to be a simple linear function of the decisive voter’s income
we are able to derive an estimation equation that is linear in the parameters, which is attractive from an
estimation standpoint because unobservables in voting are differenced away. However, the linear model
assumes that preference heterogeneity, as captured by β in equation (7), is constant across communities.
As noted previously this is a rather strong assumption given the other assumptions of the model.
Moreover, the common practice in the literature is to assume public service demand is characterized by
constant income elasticity which implies

(

− Pi
S Pji = b2 y 100
j

)

θ

,

(10)

where θ is the income elasticity of public service demand. Substituting equation (10) into equation (7)
and rearranging yields

14

It is important to note that the interpretation of estimated coefficients will change if this analysis implies that the
decisive voter is not the median income voter for majority rule. For example, if Epple and Romano’s (1996a) “Ends
against the Middle” story holds, the change in voting requirements from 50 to 55 would likely shift both voters near
the decisive income percentile and higher income voters with weak preferences for education towards supporting the
referendum. This issue is discussed in more detail in the results section.
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 pyes 1j
 pyes 2j 
 − ln
ln
 1 − pyes 1
 1 − pyes 2 
j 
j




 = d 3 exp[φZ j ] y θj1 − y θj 2 + (ε j1 − ε j 2 ) ,



[

]

(11)

where Z j is a vector containing variables that capture heterogeneity in preferences within school district j
and the d 3 parameter is the b2 parameter from equation (10) multiplied by the negative term − c3 from
equation (7). As above, the income elasticity θ is expected to be positive. Note that equation (11) is
nonlinear in the parameters. Consequently, in the empirical work that follows, we use non-linear least
squares to estimate the parameters of this model. Furthermore, as with the linear model, we consider
additional specifications that include a host of linear controls that explain changes in vote share.

5.

Data
We obtained data on vote outcomes for Propositions 26 and 39 from the Statewide Database,

maintained by the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. The
database contains aggregate vote outcomes and voter registration information, for all statewide primary
and general elections held in California since 1990. The primary unit of analysis in the statewide
database is the Census block. We aggregated the block level vote tallies and voter registration
information up to the school district level.
In the empirical framework developed in Section 4, the difference in vote shares between
Propositions 39 and 26 is a function of the difference between the 50th and 45th percentile income in a
school district. To construct estimates of the income percentiles, we used district-level data from the
2000 Census on the distribution of household income. Specifically, the 2000 Census contains
information on household income grouped into 17 income categories. We used this grouped income data
and linear interpolation to estimate the 50th and 45th percentile level of income in each district. Using
similar methods, we develop measures of the income difference for other percentiles, such as the
difference between the 40th and 35th or 60th and 55th income percentiles.
We also include a number of additional variables in several of our empirical specifications. The
first variable is the difference in voter turnout between Propositions 26 and 39. Following Coate, Conlin
and Moro (2008) and Coate and Conlin (2004) among others, we define voter turnout as the fraction of
eligible voters (i.e., voting age population) in each district that voted on Proposition 39 and Proposition
26 respectively. We include the difference in voter turnout to account for the potential impact changes in
voter turnout may have on vote outcomes between the two elections. The second variable is the
difference in the fraction of registered Republicans between Propositions 26 and 39 and the third variable
is the difference in the fraction of registered Democrats between the two propositions. We include these
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two variables to control for systematic changes in the ideological composition of voters between
elections.
In addition to the difference control variables described above, we also include several level
control variables in some of our empirical specifications. The first set of variables are district size fixed
effects. Specifically, we sorted districts into four equally sized groups based on total population, and
created three indicator variables that take the value of unity if a district is in the second, third or fourth
quartile of district size respectively. The second set of variables describe the demographic composition of
a school district. Specifically, we include controls for (1) the fraction of the population age 25 or older
with a bachelor’s degree or higher, (2) the fraction of homeowner, (3) the fraction of households that are
White and non Hispanic, (4) the fraction of households with children, and (5) the fraction of the
population age 65 or older. These variables were selected to capture factors that have been found in
earlier literature to influence voting and public spending decisions.
To implement the specification given by equation (11), which allows the distribution of
preferences to differ across districts, we also develop three variables designed to measure preference
heterogeneity within districts. As discussed in section 3, district preference heterogeneity, as captured
by β , is likely related to the distribution of income. Consequently, we include a Gini index of income
inequality. Preference heterogeneity is also likely to be related to the distribution of political ideology
within a district and the degree of racial heterogeneity. For example, Democrats may have stronger
preferences for local public spending than Republicans. Similarly, preferences for local public spending
may vary systematically across racial/ethnic groups. We measure preference heterogeneity in political
ideology and race/ethnicity using Herfindahl indices. Following Urquiola (2006), the racial heterogeneity
R

2
index we employ is: I race
= 1 − ∑ Rrj , where Rrj is racial group r’s share of the population in school
j
r =1

district j . Greater values of this index are associated with greater racial heterogeneity. Similarly, the
log y
political ideology index we employ is: I ideo
= 1 − ( pdem 2j + prep 2j ) , where pdem j is the fraction of
j

registered democrats in district j and prep j is the fraction of registered republicans in district j .
Finally, we use an approach similar to that used for the income percentiles to construct measures

(

)

of the 50th and 45th percentile tax prices. The 50th percentile tax price in district j is E j G j ⋅ h 50
j ,
where E j denotes the total enrollment in district j , G j denotes the total assessed value of property in
th
district j and h 50
j denotes the 50 percentile assessed value of owner-occupied homes in district j .

(

)

45
th
Similarly, the 45th percentile tax price is, E j G j ⋅ h 45
j where h j denotes the 45 percentile assessed
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value of owner-occupied homes in district j . District-level data on student enrollment in 2000 were
obtained from the California Department of Education while data on the total assessed value of property
in each school district in 2000 were obtained from the Coalition for Adequate School Housing, a
California school advocacy organization. Unfortunately, district-level data on the assessed value of
owner-occupied homes in California is unavailable. Consequently, we used data from the 2000 census on
the distribution of house values to estimate the 50th and 45th percentile level of home values and used
45
these home value percentiles as proxies for h 50
j and h j when constructing our tax price variables.

Our use of the market value of homes as a proxy for the assessed value of homes has
ramifications for our empirical work. Specifically, in California, home values are likely to vary
dramatically from assessed values due to Proposition 13, which prohibits the reassessment of homes for
property tax purposes except when the house is sold. Thus, two homes with the same market value may
have substantially different assessed values depending on when they were last sold. Given this fact, our
tax price variable most likely suffers from substantial measurement error. In order to address this
concern, we develop a Gini index for the heterogeneity within each district in terms of households’ years
in current residence. If all owner-occupied households have lived in their homes for the same length
time, the assessments will reflect the same market price level for all households, and estimated home
values likely provide a fairly accurate measure of tax price.
Our data have a number of limitations. The first limitation concerns school districts with
overlapping boundaries. Specifically, California contains three types of school districts: unified districts,
elementary districts and high school districts. The boundaries of the latter two types of districts overlap:
one high school district typically contains two or more elementary districts. Thus, in non-unified districts
there are really two decisive voters: the decisive voter for the elementary school district and the decisive
voter for the high school district into which the elementary district feeds. Consequently, in non-unified
districts it is unclear how one should measure the income of the proposed decisive voter. To overcome
that limitation, we restrict our sample to unified school districts. The second limitation concerns missing
data. Data on the fraction of voters supporting Proposition 26 is unavailable for 17 of the 323 unified
school districts operating in California in 1999-2000.15 We exclude these 17 districts from our analysis
leaving a final sample of 306 unified school districts.
Table 1 provides means and standard deviations over the sample of unified school districts for the
variables used in the analysis. For variables that enter our model as differences, the summary statistics
are reported separately for Propositions 26 and 39 respectively. As expected, the increase in the vote
15

15 of the 17 districts with missing vote data were located in the counties of Monterey, Humboldt and San Luis
Obispo which did not report vote tallies to the Statewide Database for Proposition 26. The remaining two districts
are small rural districts that had substantial missing observations on voting for Proposition 26.
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requirement from 50 to 55 percent is associated with a greater percentage of voters supporting the
referendum, lower decisive voter income, and lower decisive voter tax share. The change from a March
election (Prop 26) to a November election (Prop 39) also increases turnout from 28 to 43 percent of
eligible voters.
{Insert Table 1 Here}
6.

Results

Regression results for the change in vote share using the linear demand specification in equation
(9) are presented in Table 2. The first column presents the basic model that controls only for the change
in the decisive voter’s income. The second and third columns contain results from models that include
controls for changes between the two elections in turnout and party affiliation among registered voters
and those controls plus jurisdiction size fixed effects, while the fourth column contains results based on a
model that includes the controls used in column three plus additional controls for district demographic
attributes. As expected, all four regressions imply a strong positive relationship between the change in
the decisive voter’s income and the change in the fraction of ‘yes’ votes between Propositions 39 and
26.16 The estimated coefficients on the change in the decisive voter’s income range from 0.143 to 0.203
and are all statistically significant at the five percent level. These point estimates suggest that a large
fraction of the change in vote shares between the two propositions can be explained by the change in the
decisive voter’s income. Specifically, based on equation (9) and the sample of unified school districts,
our model predicts that the implied change in the decisive voter’s income is consistent with a 2.3
percentage point increase in the percent voting yes in model 1, and a 2.8, 1.7, and 2.5 percentage point
increase in the percent voting yes in models 2, 3, and 4 respectively.17 Given that the actual increase in
percent voting yes was 4.3 percentage points, our model predicts that between 39% and 65% of the
change in vote shares between the two propositions can be explained by the change in the decisive voter’s
income.18
{Insert Table 2 Here}

16

We also divided the sample into three subsamples based on the size of the increase in turnout between the two
referenda. The estimated effects were similar in magnitude, and we could not reject the hypothesis that the effect of
income was the same across these three subsamples.
17
The predicted change is estimated by calculating the change in log-odds for each school district and translating
this change into a predicted change in share voting yes based on the actual share voting yes for proposition 26 in the
school district.
18
The actual increase in the percent voting yes of 4.3 percentage points is based on the sample of unified school
districts and thus differs from the statewide increase in the percent voting yes which was 4.5 percentage points.
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Table 3 presents the results of our “Horse Races” between the median income voter for a
majority voting rule and alternative income percentiles. The first two columns present coefficient
estimates and standard errors for the change in income between the 50th and 45th percentile and the change
in income between two other percentiles that are separated by 5 percentage points. As those columns
reveal, the income differences between the 40th to 35th percentiles and the 35th to 30th percentiles clearly
dominate the income difference between the 50th and 45th percentiles. Thus, our results provide evidence
against the hypothesis that the median income voter is decisive in majority rule referenda.
The third and fourth columns of Table 3 present coefficient estimates comparing the 40th to 35th
percentile change to other percentile income differences.19 The income difference between 40th to 35th
percentile clearly dominates all other percentile income differences except for the 35th to 30th, and as in
column 1, the effect size for 40th to 35th is a little bigger than the effect size for 35th to 30th. We interpret
these results as implying that our data are consistent with a decisive voter near the 40th income percentile
for a majority voting rule. When we re-estimate the four specifications presented in Table 2 using the
change in income between the 40th and 35th percentiles rather than the 50 th and 45th percentiles, we obtain
coefficient estimates on the change in the decisive voter’s income that range between 1.89 and 2.87 (see
Table 6 below). These point estimates imply that the change in the decisive voter’s income is consistent
with between a 2.1 and a 3.2 percentage point increase in the percent voting yes between the two
referenda. Thus, based on the difference between the 40th and 35th percentile incomes, our model predicts
that between 49% and 74% of the change in vote shares between the two propositions can be explained by
the change in the decisive voter’s income.
{Insert Table 3 Here}
Our empirical identification of the 40th income percentile as decisive under majority rule is
consistent with the earlier findings by Epple and Romano (1996a) and Fletcher and Kenny (2008) that the
decisive voter is below the median income. To explicitly test Epple and Romano’s “Ends against the
Middle” hypothesis, we used data from the special school district tabulations of the 2000 Census to
calculate the fraction of high income households (incomes above $75,000) in each district that are likely
to have low demand for public education spending. We focus on three groups of households: (1)
household without children, (2) households age 55 or older, and (3) households with children in private
school. We then used our data on the fraction of high-income/low-demand households to split our sample
into two equally sized subsamples. The first subsample contains districts in which the fraction of high19

We focus on the 40th to 35th percentile change (rather than the 35 th to 30th) since the coefficient estimate on the
income difference between the 40th and 35th percentiles reported in column 1 is slightly larger than the coefficient
estimate for the 35th to 30th percentile.
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income/low-demand households is above the sample median and the second subsample contains districts
in which the fraction of high-income/low-demand households is below the sample median. Thus, the first
subsample corresponds to districts with a large fraction of high-income/low-demand households, while
the second subsample corresponds to districts with a low fraction of high-income/low-demand
households. We then estimated separate regressions, similar to the “horse race” regressions reported in
Table 3, for each of the two samples.
The results of that exercise are reported in Table 4 with the results based on subsamples of highincome households without children shown in column 1, high-income households age 55 or older shown
in column 2, and high-income households with children in private school shown in column 3.. The first
panel contains estimates using income percentile ranges that are 5 percent above and below the
percentiles range of 40th to 35th selected in Table 3 (i.e. the 45th to 40th and the 35th to 30th income
percentiles). The second panel contains estimates using income percentiles 5 percent above and below
the percentile range of 35th to 30th, which in Table 3 yielded results that were statistically
indistinguishable from the 40th to 35th percentile, and finally the third panel directly examines the horse
race comparison between the 40th to 35th and 35th to 30th income percentiles. The first row in each panel
contains estimates for the subsample that contains school districts that have a fraction of highincome/low-demand households that is above the median for all school districts, while the second row
contains estimates for the below the median subsample. We hypothesize that the income percentile of the
decisive voter should fall for the subsample of districts with a large fraction of high-income/low demand
households because these are the households expected to vote with the poor against increased spending,
and similarly the income percentile should rise for the below median subsample.
The strongest results arise for the subsamples based on high-income households without children.
In the first panel, the lower income percentile wins the “horse race” for the above median subsample and
the high income percentile wins for the below median subsample, with the estimate for the “winning”
percentile being statistically significant and the losing percentile being quite small. In the next two
panels, the higher income percentile wins the “horserace” for the below median subsample, but for the
above median subsample our estimates are simply too imprecise to make comparisons. Thus, for the
subsamples based on high-income households without children, we have evidence in all three panels of a
higher percentile decisive voter when there are fewer high-income/low-demand households and some
evidence of a lower percentile decisive voter when there are more high-income/low-demand households.
Statistical imprecision is a more substantial problem for the second two subsamples. Nonetheless, in
panel 2, both columns 2 and 3 provide evidence of a higher income percentile decisive voter for below
median subsamples. Furthermore, in panel 3, the private school subsamples provide evidence of both a
higher income percentile decisive voter for the below median subsample and a lower income percentile
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decisive voter for the above median subsample. All statistically significant estimates are consistent with
the “Ends against the Middle” story.
{Insert Table 4 Here}
While our referenda model holds for any decisive voter, it is important to acknowledge that the
interpretation of the estimated coefficients change when the results are not consistent with the median
voter model. Following the logic of Epple and Romano, high income households with low demand for
public education spending vote with the poor against levels of public spending that would be supported
by the median income voter. If high income households who do not use public education have no
demand for public services, these households simply fall at the bottom of the distribution shifting the
income percentile of the decisive voter downwards. On the other hand, if these high income households
have some demand for public education, potentially due to its impact on community environment or
property values, these households will be spread across the bottom of the income distribution. For
example, since we find that the decisive voter under majority rule is at the 40 th income percentile, the
change in voting requirements from 50 to 55 percent likely shifts the decisive voter to a percentile
between the 40th and 35th rather than to the 35th. This occurs because the change in public spending
preferred by an additional 5 percent of poor voters would also likely capture the votes of some rich
households with low demand, thus delivering more than the additional 5 percent required to pass the
measure under the 55 percent voting rule. Therefore, our estimates likely overstate the change in the
decisive voter’s income arising from the rule change between the two referenda, and understate the
impact of income changes on referenda voting and public service demand.

Heterogeneous Preference Distributions with Constant Elasticity of Demand
Nonlinear least squares results for the change in vote share using the constant elasticity of
demand specification with heterogeneous preference distributions outlined in equation (11) are presented
in Table 5. Similar to Table 2, the first column presents the basic model that controls only for the change
in the income of the decisive voter. The second, third, and fourth columns contain additively separable
terms intended to control for differences in voting patterns between the two referenda including basic
controls for turnout, jurisdiction size fixed effects, and additional controls for district demographic
attributes. In Table 5, the estimated income elasticities lie between 0.706 and 1.034, and are comparable
to income elasticity estimates based on actual education capital spending in California of between 0.70
and 0.77 (Balsdon, Brunner and Rueben, 2003). The bottom panel of Table 5 reports the results of
various non-nested hypothesis tests based on the null hypothesis that the “correct” model is either the one
based on the 50th and 45th income percentile difference or the 40 th and 35th income percentile difference.
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These non-nested hypothesis tests are constructed using the P test developed by Davidson and
MacKinnon (1981, 1982). Note that in all four specifications, we reject the null hypothesis that the
“correct” model is the one that includes the 50th versus 45th percentile income difference and fail to reject
the null hypothesis that the “correct” model is the one that includes the 40th versus 35th percentile income
difference.20
The estimated coefficients on the variables we use to control for preference heterogeneity are
generally negative and in many cases statistically significant. Specifically, the estimated coefficients on
the income inequality Gini index and the party affiliation index are negative in all four specifications and,
with the exception of the estimated coefficient on the party affiliation index in column 3, statistically
significant for the specifications reported in columns 1 through 3. In column 4, which includes district
level control variables, these variables remain negative, but decrease in magnitude somewhat and lose
significance. In the fourth model, the coefficient on racial heterogeneity is negative and statistically
significant. The negative sign on our preference heterogeneity controls is consistent with greater
heterogeneity in income, political ideology, and/or racial heterogeneity leading to larger heterogeneity in
preferences or greater variance in the unobservables that shape voting behavior as captured by β in
equation 7. Specifically, our results suggest that the influence of the decisive voter’s demand on the
determination of voting rules is smaller in more heterogeneous districts. That finding is consistent with
the theoretical implications of Romer, Rosenthal and Munley (1992) and empirical results of Romer,
Rosenthal and Munley (1992) and Gerber and Lewis (2004) that public spending and politician’s
behavior, respectively, follow the median voter’s preferences more closely in more homogenous
jurisdictions.
{Insert Table 5 Here}
To put our results into context, we can use the results reported in Table 5 to examine how a one
^

standard deviation increase in the preference heterogeneity term in equation (11), exp(φ Z ) , scales the
influence of the decisive voter’s demand on the change in vote log-odds. Evaluated at the mean of
^

exp(φ Z ) , a one standard deviation increase in the standard deviation of preferences leads to a 21.1%
decrease in the contribution of the median voter’s preferences to the log odds of voting yes in model 1,
and a 15.6%, 21.1%, and 12.8% decrease in models 2, 3, and 4, respectively. In terms of the second
20

All results presented in the preceding paragraph arise in simple constant elasticity demand models that do not
allow for heterogeneous distributions of preferences across districts. Subsample analyses similar to those presented
in Table 4 were also estimated for constant elasticity demand models and finding are very similar to those presented
in Table 4, consistently supporting the “Ends against the Middle” story.
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referenda, a one standard deviation increase in heterogeneity in all school districts would have decreased
predicted support for the referenda by 5.0 percentage points in model 1, and by 4.7, 3.8, and 5.3
percentage points in models 2, 3, and 4, respectively.21 Given that the actual percent yes in the second
referenda was 54.4%, these predicted declines in support suggest that the referenda would have been
defeated in models and 1, 2 and 4 and passed by a margin of only 1 percentage point in model 3.

Tax Price Models
As discussed in the data section, we observe both a tax price based on self-reported housing
prices and a Gini index of how long households have lived in their housing units. We expect that the tax
price variable will accurately capture the tax price for jurisdictions homogeneous in terms of time a
current residence, those with a Gini near zero. To incorporate tax price into our model that assumes a
linear form for public service demand, we expand equation (9) by including the difference between the
40th and 35th percentile tax price, the Gini index of homeownership tenure length, and the Gini index
interacted with the tax price difference variable. The coefficient on the tax price difference variable itself
is expected to be negative since public service demand falls with tax price.
To incorporate tax price into our model that assumes heterogeneous preference distributions and
constant elasticity demands, we expand equation (11) as follows:
 pyes 2j
ln
 1 − pyes 2
j



 pyes 1j
 − ln

 1 − pyes 1
j




 = d 3 exp[φZ j ] y θj1 p δj1+γg R − y θj 2 p δj 2+αg R + (ε j1 − ε j 2 ) ,



[

]

(12)

where p is the tax price, δ is price elasticity of public service demand, g R is the length of residence
Gini, and γ allows the estimated parameter on price to differ from the price elasticity when jurisdictions
are heterogeneous in terms of length of time in current residence.
Results based on our models that include tax price are shown in Table 6. Specifically, results
based on the linear demand model are presented in columns 1-3, while results based on the heterogeneous
preference distribution model are presented in columns 4-6. For both models, we present the basic
estimates with just decisive voter’s income (using the 40th percentile as the decisive voter for a majority
rule) in columns 1 and 4. In columns 2 and 5, we present results based on models that also include
controls for the 40th and 35th percentile tax price,22 and finally in columns 3 and 6 we allow the effect of
tax price to vary with jurisdiction heterogeneity in time in residence. Results are presented in four panels
21

The predicted change is estimated by calculating the change in log-odds for each school district for a one standard
deviation change in the heterogeneity index and translating this change into a predicted change in share voting yes
based on the actual share voting yes for proposition 39 in the school district.
22
We get very similar results if we use the median and 45th percentile tax price.
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– one for each of the four sets of linear controls found in Table 2. In columns 2 and 4, the estimated
coefficients on the tax price variable are typically of the wrong sign and statistically insignificant. As
discussed previously, this result is not surprising given that our measure of tax price most likely suffers
from substantial measurement error due to the unique rules for property assessment in California.
However, when we add the interaction with the time in residence Gini (columns 3 and 6), we find a
negative relationship between support for the referenda and tax price as predicted by theory. While noisy,
the price elasticity estimates are comparable in magnitude to the existing literature, which has often
produced at best only noisy and wide ranging estimates of price elasticity (Ross and Yinger, 1999). Most
importantly, our income estimates remain statistically significant and are fairly stable in magnitude across
these models.
{Insert Table 6 Here}
9. Counterfactuals

In order to further test whether we have truly identified a relationship between changes in the
decisive voter’s income, we conduct two counterfactuals. The logic behind our counterfactuals is simple:
if the relationship we have identified is truly causal, then it should hold for school districts (which would
have been directly affected by the outcomes of Propositions 26 and 39) but it should not hold for other
political or geographic entities. For example, while we expect the income difference between the 45th and
35th percentile voter in a school district to explain differences in vote shares within school districts we
would not expect the income difference between the 40th and 35th percentile voter in a census tract or a
state assembly district to explain differences in vote shares within those geographic/political entities.
That is, for political/geographic entities other than school districts, the income difference between the 40th
and 35th percentile voter should be uncorrelated with changes in vote shares.
Our rationale for choosing census tracts and State Assembly Districts (SAD) is based on their size
and their lack of relevance for the provision of any local public services. Census tracts tend to be much
smaller than many school districts while state assembly districts are much larger than census tracts and
often contain many school districts. While some school districts such as Los Angeles Unified contain
many SAD’s, California contains a total of 80 SAD’s relative to approximately 1,000 school districts.
Thus, our counterfactuals cover geographic/political entities that are both smaller and larger than school
districts on average. Further, since neither of these geographic regions represents a level of local
government, the decisive voter income variables should not be related to any unexpected fiscal
implications of Propositions 26 and 39.
To implement our counterfactuals we estimate models identical to those reported in Table 2,
except that we use the income 40th and 35th income percentiles, and calculate those percentiles for either
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census tracts or state assembly districts. For example, our counterfactual involving census tracts utilizes
information for 6,840 census tracts on vote shares in a census tract, income differences between the 40th
and 35th percentile voter in a census tract, etc. Similarly, our counterfactual involving state assembly
districts utilizes information for the 80 SAD’s in California on vote shares within SAD’s, income
percentiles within SAD’s, etc.23 In addition, we also present estimates for census tract models that
include district fixed effects. District fixed effects are included to insulate the estimates against the
systematic across district variation that drives the estimates in the school district sample.24 Naturally, the
school district fixed effects could also contaminate our SAD estimates (in fact some mid-sized school
districts essentially are SAD’s), but a natural analog to the census tract fixed effects model does not exist
because some SAD’s contain many school districts while others are entirely contained within school
districts.
Results for the counterfactuals are reported in Table 7. In the interest of brevity, we report only
the estimated coefficients on the income difference variable. The first column of Table 7 replicates the
school district results reported in column 1 of Table 6. The second, third and fourth columns present our
counterfactuals based on state assembly districts, census tracts and a census tract model with district fixed
effects, respectively. The four panels presented in Table 7 correspond to the four models listed in Table
2. The results reported in Table 7 are quite striking. In all our counterfactuals the estimated coefficients
on the difference between the 40th and 35th percentile income are significantly smaller than the estimates
for school districts with the exception of one model for the State Assembly Districts, where the estimate
is very noisy. Furthermore, all the estimated coefficients on the difference between the 40th and 35th
percentile income in our counterfactuals are statistically insignificant. Thus, the results reported in Table
7 give us increased confidence that our results are capturing a relationship between changes in the
proposed decisive voter’s income and voting patterns that is unique to school districts.
{Insert Table 7 Here}
9.

Conclusion

This paper provides a direct test of the political economy “as if” proposition that underlies nearly
all empirical studies that utilize the median voter model. Specifically, we employ a unique dataset to
examine whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending referenda. Previous tests
of the median voter model have typically relied on aggregate cross sectional data to examine whether the
voter with the median income is pivotal. These studies are likely biased because communities differ
23

Similar results arise using the difference between the 50th and 45th percentile incomes.
Standard errors for this model are also clustered at the school district level because heteroscedasticity can bias the
estimation of standard errors in fixed effect models.
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across a variety of unobservable dimensions that are likely correlated with the distribution of income in a
community. In contrast to previous studies, we make use of a unique natural experiment that allows us to
estimate a first difference specification that controls for jurisdiction unobservables and avoids the
fundamental problem of measuring the actual services demanded by voters. Consequently, we are able to
avoid many of the problems that have hindered prior studies that have tested the median voter hypothesis.
Our empirical results suggest that voters understand the impact of changes in the identity of the
decisive voter and rationally consider the impact of voting rules on local spending when voting on
referenda that determine voting rules. However, our results strongly suggest that even under majority rule
voting, the voter with the median income is not decisive. Rather, our results are consistent with a decisive
voter at the 40th percentile income for majority voting. That finding is consistent with an “Ends against
the Middle” story where the income percentile of the decisive voter lies below the median income for a
majority voting rule because low demand, high income individuals vote with the poor against public
spending. Further, we directly test the “Ends against the Middle” hypothesis by splitting the sample
between jurisdictions that contain more or less low demand, high income households, and all our findings
support the hypothesis.
The magnitudes of our findings also appear to be quite reasonable and are consistent with
previous literature. For example, our results suggest that the implied change in the decisive voter’s
income is consistent with between a 2.1 and 3.2 percentage point increase in the percent voting yes due to
the change in the vote requirement from 50 to 55 percent, while the actual increase in percent voting yes
was 4.3 percentage points. Further, constant elasticity of demand models provide estimated income
elasticities of between 0.706 and 1.034, which are stable across specifications and consistent with the
existing literature. In our model with tax price, our price elasticity estimates are noisier, but again
reasonable, falling between -0.707 and -1.764. Finally, the estimated effect of median income on voting
is not present in counterfactuals estimated at the census tract and state assembly district level.
In our constant elasticity of demand models with heterogeneous preference distributions we
consistently find that school district income heterogeneity is associated with reduced influence of the
decisive voter’s preferences on support for the referenda, a result consistent with Gerber and Lewis’s
(2004) analysis of politician’s behavior. In terms of magnitude, we find that a one standard deviation
increase in heterogeneity among all school districts would have reduced support for the second referenda
(which passed by 4.4 percentage points) by between 5.3 and 3.8 percentage points. Earlier work by
Romer, Rosenthal and Munley (1992) and Rothstein (1994) conclude that the decisive voter’s preferences
should have less influence on support for referenda in more heterogeneous jurisdictions, and our findings
provide strong support for the implications of their theoretical models. Recent empirical work by
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) and Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004) find that heterogeneous
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communities spend less on productive public goods and that jurisdiction consolidation is reduced when
the surrounding region is heterogeneous, respectively. Our model along with the earlier work of Romer,
Rosenthal and Munley (1992) and Rothstein (1994) identifies another important mechanism by which
heterogeneity influences public choice concerning the provision of local public goods. Referenda models
of this sort clearly imply that heterogeneity in preferences within a jurisdiction will reduce electoral
support for both referenda’s that authorize spending on public services, as well as referenda’s intended to
liberalize the rules under which spending is authorized.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics

Proposition 26
Variable

Proposition 39

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Fraction Yes

0.477

0.085

0.505

0.084

Income

47,421

17,286

42,835

15,806

Turnout

0.279

0.098

0.431

0.122

Fraction Republican

0.373

0.114

0.374

0.114

Fraction Democrat

0.441

0.108

0.436

0.106

Tax Price

0.532

0.291

0.504

0.279

Level Variables

Mean

St. Dev.

Fraction College Educated

0.224

0.150

Fraction Homeowner

0.634

0.109

Fraction H.H. White

0.640

0.217

Fraction H.H. with Children

0.381

0.096

Fraction Age 65 or Older

0.115

0.046

Gini Index for Years in Current Residence

0.453

0.028

Gini Index of Income Inequality

0.423

0.039

Herfindahl for Party Affiliation

0.646

0.051

Herfindahl for Race/Ethnicity

0.489

0.147

Difference Variables

Notes : Table contains means and standard deviations in the sample of unified school districts in California for the two
referenda where the income and tax price variables represent the 50th and 45th percentile values for Proposition 26 and 39,
respectively.
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Table 2
Coefficient Estimates: Linear Demand Model

Decisive Voter Income ($10,000's)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.188**
(0.051)

0.232**
(0.064)
0.220
(0.160)
-0.804*
(0.467)
0.052
(0.491)

0.143**
(0.058)
0.182
(0.154)
-0.404
(0.367)
-0.022
(0.446)
0.019
(0.023)
0.085***
(0.021)
0.105**
(0.021)

0.203**
(0.090)
0.120
(0.154)
-0.208
(0.373)
-0.207
(0.492)
0.019
(0.022)
0.081**
(0.021)
0.094**
(0.021)
-0.096
(0.104)
0.041
(0.100)
-0.065
(0.056)
-0.297
(0.190)
-0.698**
(0.223)

306
0.05

306
0.08

306
0.18

306
0.21

Turnout
Fraction Democrat
Fraction Republican
Second Quantile of Size
Third Quantile of Size
Fourth Quantile of Size
Fraction College Educated
Fraction Homeowner
Fraction H.H. White
Fraction H.H. with Children
Fraction Age 65 or Older

R-Square
Observations

Notes: Columns 1-4 contain OLS parameter estimates for the change in log odds of share voting yes between the two
referenda. The rows denoted by decisive voter income, turnout, fraction democrat, and fraction republican contain estimates
on the change in those variables between the two referenda while the next eight rows contain estimates on the district size fixed
effects and school district demographic attributes. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, and statistical significance
at the 10% and 5% level are denoted by * and **, respectively.
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Table 3
Coefficient Estimates: “Horse Race” Regressions
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Percentile

Coefficient

St. Error

Percentile

Coefficient

St. Error

50th - 45th
65th - 60th

0.123
0.099

(0.113)
(0.072)

40th - 35th
55th - 50th

0.265**
0.044

(0.104)
(0.083)

50th - 45th
60th - 55th

0.162
0.060

(0.111)
(0.081)

40th - 35th
50th - 45th

0.246**
0.072

(0.106)
(0.102)

50th - 45th
55th - 50th

0.176
0.037

(0.133)
(0.112)

40th - 35th
45th - 40th

0.255**
0.047

(0.115)
(0.117)

50th - 45th

0.111

(0.153)

40th - 35th

0.169

(0.120)

0.166

(0.121)

0.224**

(0.108)

0.114

(0.114)

0.208**

(0.101)

0.149

(0.099)

0.287**

(0.107)

0.001

(0.096)

th

45 - 40

th

50th - 45th
th

40 - 35

th

50th - 45th
th

35 - 30

th

50th - 45th
th

30 - 25

th

th

th

0.123

(0.157)

35 - 30

0.072

(0.102)

40th - 35th
th

th

0.246**

(0.106)

30 - 25

0.069

(0.103)

40th - 35th
th

th

0.240**

(0.105)

25 - 20

0.123

(0.098)

40th - 35th

0.175

th

20 - 15

(0.108)

th

Notes: Columns 1-2 contain OLS estimates, based on model 4 of Table 2, for various "horse races" between
the difference in the 50th and 45th percentiles incomes and various other income percentile differences.
Columns 3-4 contain OLS estimates for various "horse races" between the difference in the 40th and 35th
percentiles incomes and various other income percentile differences. Robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses, and statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level are denoted by * and **, respectively.
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Table 4
Coefficient Estimates: “Ends Against Middle” Regressions

Percentile

(1)

(2)

(3)

High Income no Children

High Income Age 55 or older

High Income Private School

Coefficient

St. Error

Coefficient

St. Error

Coefficient

St. Error

th

th

-0.017
0.244**

(0.090)
(0.110)

0.008
0.161

(0.109)
(0.127)

0.052
0.204

(0.111)
(0.133)

0.609**

(0.201)

0.178

(0.230)

0.324

(0.204)

0.138

(0.181)

0.314

(0.199)

0.238

(0.163)

Above Median

45 - 40
th
th
35 - 30

Below Median

45 - 40

th

th

th

th

th

th

0.128
0.109

(0.106)
(0.147)

0.115
0.078

(0.105)
(0.150)

0.021
0.228

(0.121)
(0.149)

0.710**

(0.229)

0.461*

(0.251)

0.531**

(0.220)

35 - 30
Above Median

40 - 35
th
th
30 - 25

Below Median

40 - 35

th

th

th

th

-0.070

(0.186)

0.033

(0.198)

-0.067

(0.165)

th

th

0.046
0.202

(0.116)
(0.126)

0.081
0.113

(0.117)
(0.134)

-0.043
0.269*

(0.133)
(0.145)

th

th

0.698**
-0.038

(0.233)
(0.191)

0.375
0.146

(0.285)
(0.241)

0.460*
0.060

(0.244)
(0.194)

30 - 25
Above Median

40 - 35
th
th
35 - 30

Below Median

40 - 35
th
th
35 - 30

Notes: Columns 1-3 contain OLS estimates, based on model 4 of Table 2, for various "horse races" between different income percentile differences.
Rows denoted Above Median correspond to the subsample of districts with high concentrations of high-income/low-demand households, while rows
denoted Below Median correspond to the subsample of districts with low concentrations of high-income/low-demand households. Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses, and statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level are denoted by * and **, respectively.
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Table 5
Coefficient Estimates: Constant Elasticity of Demand with Preference Heterogeneity

Income

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1.005**
(0.175)

0.997**
(0.152)
0.288**
(0.145)
-0.714*
(0.426)
0.097
(0.485)

1.034**
(0.221)
0.250*
(0.141)
-0.451
(0.346)
0.135
(0.456)
0.010
(0.023)
0.076**
(0.021)
0.103**
(0.022)

0.706**
(0.221)
0.168
(0.158)
-0.377
(0.350)
0.106
(0.465)
0.012
(0.021)
0.078**
(0.021)
0.102**
(0.022)
-0.015
(0.094)
-0.028
(0.115)
0.002
(0.055)
-0.021
(0.131)
-0.363
(0.248)

-3.243**
(1.429)
-2.848**
(1.325)
0.513
(0.407)

-2.774**
(1.153)
-2.065*
(1.092)
0.267
(0.354)

-3.562**
(1.513)
-2.304
(1.456)
-0.771
(0.499)

-2.195
(1.348)
-1.099
(1.255)
-0.610*
(0.349)

p-value

p-value

p-value

p-value

0.027**

0.013**

0.017**

0.017 **

0.759

0.489

0.986

0.104

Turnout
Fraction Democrat
Fraction Republican
Second Quantile of Size
Third Quantile of Size
Fourth Quantile of Size
Fraction College Educated
Fraction Homeowner
Fraction H.H. White
Fraction H.H. with Children
Fraction Age 55 or Older
Preference Heterogeneity Parameters
Gini Index of Income Inequality
Party Affiliation Index
Racial Index
P Test
th

H0: 50 - 45

th

H0: 40th - 35th

Notes: Table presents the estimates from the constant elasticity of demand model with preference heterogeneity shown in
equation (11). The estimates presented in the first row under income represents elasticity while the other estimates are
coefficients on the variables in a standard linear specification. The bottom panel of the table shows the results of non-nested ptests based on the null hypothesis that the "correct" model is the model that includes the income percentile difference listed
after H0:. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, and statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level are denoted by
* and **, respectively.
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Table 6
Coefficient Estimates from Regressions that Include Tax Price

(1)

(2)

(3)

Linear
Income
Model 1

1.005**
(0.175)

0.840**
(0.185)
0.390**
(0.142)

0.775**
(0.184)
-0.779**
(0.220)
2.734**
(0.583)

0.279**
(0.069)

0.282**
(0.069)
-0.002
(0.006)

0.234**
(0.073)
-0.041**
(0.014)
0.117**
(0.037)

0.997**
(0.152)

0.883**
(0.147)
0.219**
(0.110)

0.855**
(0.159)
-1.764**
(0.675)
4.627**
(1.607)

0.189**
(0.064)

0.188**
(0.064)
0.000
(0.005)

0.174**
(0.066)
-0.035**
(0.014)
0.097**
(0.037)

1.034**
(0.221)

0.929**
(0.202)
0.197
(0.140)

0.880**
(0.200)
-1.404**
(0.671)
3.835**
(1.648)

0.287**
(0.091)

0.289**
(0.091)
0.002
(0.005)

0.270**
(0.100)
-0.038**
(0.015)
0.112**
(0.039)

0.706**
(0.221)

0.644**
(0.186)
0.094
(0.081)

0.567**
(0.177)
-0.707
(0.410)*
2.015*
(1.043)

Tax Price*Tenure Gini

Model 3

Tax Price
Tax Price*Tenure Gini
Income

Model 4

Tax Price

Constant Elasticity with Preference Heterogeneity
0.179**
(0.060)
-0.003
(0.009)
0.037
(0.028)

Tax Price

Income

(6)

0.219**
(0.058)
0.004
(0.005)

Tax Price*Tenure Gini

Model 2

(5)

0.226**
(0.056)

Tax Price

Income

(4)

Tax Price*Tenure Gini

Notes: Table presents parameter estimates for models that also include controls for tax price. Columns 1-3 show estimates for the linear model while
columns 4-6 show estimates for the constant elasticity of demand model with preference heterogeneity. The panels correspond to the models listed in
Table 2 and all models contain the same control variables listed in Table 2. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, and statistical significance
at the 10% and 5% level are denoted by * and **, respectively.
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Table 7
Coefficient Estimates from Counterfactuals

Income
Model 1
Observations
Income
Model 2
Observations
Income
Model 3
Observations
Income
Model 4
Observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Census Tracts

School Districts

State Assembly
Districts

Census Tracts with
District Fixed Effects

0.226**
(0.056)

0.013
(0.090)

-0.008
(0.019)

-0.020*
(0.012)

306

80

6891

6891

0.279**
(0.069)

0.052
(0.085)

0.013
(0.017)

-0.009
(0.009)

306

80

6891

6891

0.189**
(0.064)

0.088
(0.091)

0.014
(0.017)

-0.008
(0.009)

306

80

6891

6891

0.287**
(0.091)

0.308
(0.352)

0.030
(0.019)

-0.017
(0.014)

306

80

6891

6891

Notes: Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 present O.L.S. coefficient estimates for the difference between the 40th and 35th percentile
income for the sample of school districts, State Assembly districts and Census tracts, respectively. The panels correspond to the
models listed in Table 2 and all models contain the same control variables listed in Table 2. Robust standard errors are shown
in parentheses, and statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level are denoted by * and **, respectively.
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